[Solved] Hardware Proposal: Moving from "Privacy Software" to "Safety Hardware"

To the Furi Labs Product Team,

As a supporter of the Linux mobile ecosystem, I value the work done on FuriOS and the FLX1s. However, as the market matures in 2026, "de-Googled software" is no longer enough to justify the premium price of mid-range hardware. To truly become a "Safety Device," Furi Labs must lead where Big Tech cannot: Open-Source Silicon and Verifiable Hardware.

I am requesting that future iterations of Furi hardware move beyond standard budget components and integrate the following "Trust-No-One" hardware features:

1. Integration of an Open-Source Secure Element (TROPIC01)

Big Tech uses "Black Box" chips (Knox, Titan, Secure Enclave) that require total trust in the manufacturer.

• Request: Integrate an auditable, open-source secure element like the Tropic Square TROPIC01.

• Justification: This moves security from a "pinky promise" to a verifiable reality. An auditable chip for disk encryption and key storage is the only way to prove no backdoors exist at the silicon level. It justifies a premium price by providing security that even a $1,200 flagship cannot offer.

2. Active Tamper-Zeroization (Physical Self-Destruct)

Privacy phones are prime targets for forensic "chip-off" or "cold-boot" attacks once physically seized.

• Request: Add internal physical tamper sensors (light-sensitive photodiodes or a voltage-monitored mesh) linked directly to the Secure Element.

• Justification: If the device casing is physically breached, the hardware should automatically "zeroize" (wipe) the master encryption keys. This makes the phone truly safe for users in high-risk environments where physical seizure is the primary threat.

3. Modular Security via Pogo Pins (HSM Backpack)

The "all-in-one" phone model is a security liability because the keys and the data live in the same box.

• Request: Develop an external Hardware Security Module (HSM) that connects via the phone's expansion pins.

• Justification: Allow users to physically remove their "security brain" (PGP keys, root secrets) and carry it separately. This creates a "Possession-Based" security model. Without the physical module attached, the phone remains an encrypted brick, providing a level of protection that software-only solutions cannot match.

Conclusion: By choosing lower-spec CPUs to maintain margins, you risk being seen as a "Privacy Tax" company. By choosing "Secure-by-Design" hardware, you become an essential tool for digital sovereignty. We don't want a cheaper phone; we want a phone that is physically incapable of betraying us.